BXTIA8 
.CSTT 


THE  MORAL  LAW 

THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENT  OF  AMERICAN  LIBERTY. 

THE  SUBSTANCE  OP  A  LECTURE, 

TO    THE 

READ  APRIL  19,  1839, 

/ 

BY  N.  11EW1T. 

PUBLISHED  AT  THEIR  REQUEST 


BRIDGEPORT: 
Stills  Nichols  &  Co.,  Printers^ 


1S39. 


LECTURE. 


The  changes  which  happen  in  communities,  either  for  the  better 
or  the  worse,  in  any  particular  age,  proceed  from  causes  which  be- 
gan to  operate  in  the  past.  One  generation  sows,  and  the  next  reaps. 
The  most  important  of  these  changes  respect  opinion  and  belief: 
for  the  general  mind  and  character  of  a  people  shape  those  events 
which  affect  their  common  welfare. 

Opinions,  which  originate  and  lead  on  great  civil  and  religious 
changes  in  states  and  nations,  under  the  ordinary  course  of  Provi- 
dence, are,  at  the  first,  entertained  by  a  few  ;  not  unirequently  by 
one  only.  They  spread  slowly  ;  and  in  the  face  of  resistance  and 
reproach.  They  are  promoted  at  the  expense  of  hard  labor,  and 
many  dangers  and  losses  of  their  authors  and  abettors.  But  seldom 
docs  the  planter  of  a  prolific  thought,  live  to  see  it  a  great  tree,  and 
find  rest  from  his  labors  beneath  the  shadow  of  its  branches,  and  a 
rich  reward  from  its  fruit.  But  although  new  and  revolutionary  doc- 
trines are  of  slow  growth,  still  they  grow  ;  and  with  accelerated  mo- 
tion as  they  advance.  Resistance  slackens  ;  for  it  is  wearisome  to 
be  long  on  the  defensive  merely.  To  resist  and  defend  is  a  nega- 
tive good  ;  to  advance  and  to  obtain  is  positive,  and  therefore  inviting 
and  inspiring.  The  best  that  defendants  can  gain  by  their  labor  and 
hardship  is  merely  not  to  lose,  and  every  defection  from  their  ranks 
is  disheartening,  and  lessens  the  means  of  further  resistance  ;  whilst 
every  convert  to  the  new  party  is  every  way  great  gain.  Hence  all 
innovators,  by  perseverence,  ultimately  succeed. 

It  becomes  now  a  matter  of  the  highest  moment  to  the  coming 
generation,  for  their  friends  in  this,  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  the 
current  opinions  of  the  present  day.  No  matter  by  whom,  or  in 
what  form,  or  for  what  professed  end,  doctrines  concerning  the  fun- 


tiamental  concerns  of  man  are  brought  forward  and  thrown  into  cir- 
culation. They  merit  the  strictest  scrutiny  ;  for  they  are  either  true 
or  false,  good  or  bad,  and  if  not  properly  disposed  of,  and  in  season, 
the  next  age  will  rue  our  negligence. 

Induced  by  these  reflections,  I  submit  with  freedom  to  your  con- 
sideration, my  thoughts  on  the  notion  of  self '-sovereignly ,  advocated 
by  many  in  our  times,  as  one  of  the  essential  attributes  of  a  freeman. 
By  self-sovereignty,  as  this  phrase  is  employed  by  those  who  harbor 
and  scatter  dangerous  opinions,  is  meant  that  man  by  nature  is  the 
supreme  lord  of  himself,  and  cannot  rightfully  be  bound  by  any  ob- 
ligation or  law,  otherwise  than  by  his  free  consent.  Under  the  shel- 
ter of  the  abused  name  of  liberty,  this  false  and  pernicious  dogma  is 
propagated  in  a  thousand  forms. 

On  the  present  occasion,  but  one  or  two  instances  of  the  introduc- 
tion and  partial  adoption  of  this  dogma,  will  be  stated  and  illustra- 
ted ;  and  this  in  rather  a  desultory  manner.  Preparatory  lo  their 
specification,  it  will  subserve  my  design  briefly  to  advert  to  the  opin- 
ions and  belief  of  our  forefathers,  as  their  sentiments  appear  in  their 
most  deliberate  and  momentous  declarations  and  acts.  They  assert- 
ed their  civil  rights,  and  claimed  their  political  independence  of  the 
mother  country,  not  because  they  were  by  nature  invested  wilh  self- 
supremacy,  but  because  they  were  the  dependent  creatures  of  God, 
and  from  him  had  received  all  the  rights  and  liberties  necessary  to 
their  well-being.  "We  hold,"  they  say,  "these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident:  That  all  men  are  created  equal:  that  they  are  endowed 
by  their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  rights  :  that  among  these, 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  The  sages  and  he- 
roes of  '7G,  regarded  American  liberty  as  the  legitimate  daughter  of 
reason  and  piety.  They  held  the  rights  of  man  as  the  gifts  of  God, 
and  in  the  light  of  self-evident  truth,  saw  them  descending  from 
heaven  ;  and  as  the  children  of  God,  claimed  them,  fresh  and  fair, 
from  the  hands  of  their  maker.  Justice  and  reason,  not  will  and 
passion,  led  them  to  assert  their  civil  freedom  and  political  indepen- 
dence. It  was  not  will,  but  reason  ;  it  was  not  passion,  but  duty, 
and  both  sanctioned  by  piety,  which  prompted,  and  wrought  out  the 
American  Revolution.  On  no  other  grounds  could  they  have  justi- 
fied themselves,  nor  can  we  now  justify  them,  from  perfidy  and  trea- 
son. The  blood  shed  in  the  war  of  the  revolution,  cries  to  God  for 
vengeance,  if  his  laws  cannot  be  plead  in  their  defence.  They 
claimed  not  a  lawless  will — an  irresponsible  self-sovereignty.     If  so, 


why  needed  lliey  adduce  self-evident  truth  ?  Why  appeal  to  the 
charter  of  rights,  under  the  seal  of  the  Lord  of  all  ?  They  might 
have  said,  "  It  is  our  sovereign  will  and  pleasure  to  he  free,"  and  said 
no  more.  This  is  the  style  royal  ;  the  set  form  of  speech  for  abso- 
lute  monarclis.  Our  will  is  reason,  and  our  might  is  justice.  Had  these 
heen  the  sentiments  of  our  patriot  fathers,  they  would  have  heen 
savages  ;  nay,  worse  than  these  :  perfidious  traitors  to  their  king 
and  country.  The  moral  and  civil  code  of  savages  and  villains,  is 
simple  and  short ;  will  and  might  are  the  reason  and  the  rule.  Had 
our  fathers  assumed  the  dogma  that  man  can  be  bound  by  his  volun- 
tary consent  only,  and  that  these  obligations  may  be  dissolved  at 
will,  tliey  would  not  have  given  reasons  for  their  refusing  9f  submis- 
sion to  the  British  crown:  they  would  not  have  used  arguments  in 
justification  of  their  revolt  from  it.  He  who  resorts  to  reason — who 
appeals  to  justice  and  to  God  in  defence  of  his  declarations  and  acts, 
thereby  renounces  all  claim  to  sovereignty.  The  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence, it  is  hence  most  evident,  repudiates  the  doctrine  of 
man's  self-sovereignty,  and  puts  his  subjection  to  truth  and  right- 
eousness, and  his  allegiance  to  the  throne  of  God,  as  the  corner-stone 
of  American  Liberty. 

The  subsequent  proceedings  of  our  predecessors,  throughout  the 
war  of  the  revolution,  and  in  the  constitution,  organization,  and  ad- 
ministration of  the  General  and  State  Governments  proceeded  on 
the  same  principles.  In  no  public  acts  of  theirs,  whether  organical, 
legislative,  executive  or  judicial,  can  the  atheistical  and  brutal  dog- 
ma be  found,  that  either  the  citizens  singly,  or  the  nation  collective- 
ly, are  irresponsible  and  absolute  sovereigns.  Suppose  now  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  should  proclaim  to  the  nations  of 
the  earth,  that  it  asserted  for  itself  the  prerogative  of  absolute  sove- 
reignty— a  lawless  will,  and  its  irresponsible  exercise,  regardless  of 
the  law  of  nature  and  of  nations — would  not  the  human  race  with  one 
voice,  denounce  us  as  a  horde  of  pirates,  and  the  enemies  of  man- 
kind ?  What  validity  would  there  be  in  our  treaties,  or  security  in 
our  promises?  In  short,  how  can  society  exist  at  all,  and  in  its  ru- 
dest stale,  if  the  individuals  composing  it  claim,  each  one  for  himself, 
the  absolute  dominion  over  himself,  to  will  and  act  according  to  his 
pleasure  ?  The  first  self-evident  truth  mentioned  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  "  that  all  men  are  created  equal,"  which  is  the 
theoretic  axiom  of  our  civil  pohly,  necessarily  implies  the  reciprocal 
relation  of  each  to  all,  and  the  corresponding  duties  of  that  relation. 


"  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as   thyself,"    is  a  moral  rule  result- 
ing directly  and  unavoidably  from  the  axiom,  "  men  are  equal." 

In  our  time,  this  notion  of  self-sovereignty,  so  much  at  war  with 
the  true  spirit  of  our  government  and  laws,  as  well  as  with  truth  and 
righteousness,  has  crept  in,  and  is  making  progress  with  frightful  ra- 
pidity. Under  the  current  phrase  "  the  will  of  the  people  is  su- 
preme law,"  the  implication  that  there  is  no  law  to  govern  the  will 
of  the  people,  is  caught  up  and  appropriated  to  individuals  singly,  as 
well  as  to  the  people  collectively.  Hence  the  strong  tendency  in  the 
popular  mind  to  abridge  the  authority  of  law,  and  to  narrow  down 
its  dominion  to  the  fewest  possible  cases.  The  efforts  making  to 
subject  alLjudges  and  other  law  officers  to  popular  election,  and  to 
shorten  their  term  of  office  in  order  to  augment  their  immediate  de- 
pendence on  the  will  of  the  people,  spring  from  the  same  bitter  root.  All 
must  have  observed  the  rapid  growth  of  an  unwillingness  to  convict 
and  punish  offenders  against  criminal  law  ;  and  also  to  soften  down 
all  punishment,  and  even  to  convert  punishment  into  benefit  to  the 
criminal  himself.  If  this  tenderness  for  villains  sprung  from  genuine 
benevolence  to  mankind,  it  would  be  a  weakness  only  ;  but  proceed- 
ing from  lawlessness  and  indifference  to  the  turpitude  of  crimes  against 
the  peace  and  safety  of  society,  it  is  a  proof  of  the  extent  and  depth 
of  false  and  barbarous  principles. 

I  come  to  the  first  of  the  specifications  mentioned,  as  evidential  of 
*he  existence  and  operation  of  that  dogma  of  self-sovereignty,  which 
I  have  exploded.  It  is,  that  electors  have  the  absolute  right  of  vo- 
ting for  whomsoever  they  please,  without  respect  to  any  other  law 
of  choice  in  selecting  the  officers  of  government,  than  their  mere 
will  and  pleasure. 

That  this  claim  of  sovereignty  in  voting  is  contrary  to  the  consti- 
tution and  laws  of  our  country,  appears  by  the  qualifications  for  par- 
ticular officers  specified  both  in  the  constitution  of  the  General  and 
State  Governments,  and  by  their  statutes.  The  President  of  the 
United  States,  for  example,  must  be  a  native,  and  of  a  certain  age  ; 
Senators  and  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  like  man- 
ner, must  have  given  qualifications  before  they  can  be  candidates  for 
election.  In  Connecticut,  no  member  of  the  legislature  can  hold  an 
office  of  the  General  Government.  The  freeman's  oath,  and  the  stat- 
ute against  bribery  at  elections,  limit  and  define  the  rights  of  elect- 
tors.  But  all  these  limitations  of  the  choice  of  freemen  in  selecting 
their  rulers  are  inconsistent  with  the  notion  of  absolute  sovereignty 


as  free  voters.  Tlic  right  of  voting  is  restricted,  and  is  not  there- 
fore absolute.  Every  elector  is  bound  by  law  and  his  oath,  to  vote 
for  those  men  who  have  the  qualities  specified  therein,  and  of  course 
he  is  confined  by  his  obligations  to  his  oath  and  to  his  country,  to 
vote,  not  just  as  he  pleases,  but  just  as  he  ought.  He  is  then  not  at 
liberty  to  consult  his  will,  but  to  do  his  duty.  Think  a  moment  of 
the  consequences  which  necessarily  follow  the  supposition  that  eve- 
ry freeman  has  the  prerogative  of  absolute  choice  in  selecting  the 
officers  of  Government.  In  this  case,  as  his  choice  is  unlimited,  he 
may  vote  for  foreigners,  Indians,  slaves,  women  and  children  ;  nay, 
for  mules,  and  cats,  and  dogs.  For  however  ridiculous  and  mon- 
strous this  inference  may  appear,  it  is  no  more  than  a  just  and  ne- 
cessary consequence  from  the  assumption  that  freemen  are  at  per- 
fect liberty  to  vote  for  whom  they  please. 

That  freedom  of  electing  our  rulers,  and  the  personal  right  of 
choice  which  is  secured  to  us  by  that  civil  and  political  liberty  which 
is  our  birth-right  and  our  glory,  is  a  legal  and  moral  attribute.  To 
exercise  it,  men  must  obey  the  laws,  and  act  conscientiously.  A 
lawless  will,  and  an  irresponsible  self-sovereignty  are  subversive  of 
all  social  order,  alike  destructive  of  law  and  liberty. 

Closely  allied  to  the  notion  of  the  absolute  right  of  voting  for  officers 
as  each  one  pleases,  and  growing  out  of  it,  is  the  practice  of  subject- 
ing principles  of  law  and  policy  to  the  tribunal  of  the  ballot  box,  as 
the  court  of  last  resort,  whose  decisions  are  final  and  imperative. — 
There  are  principles  of  policy  merely — questions  of  discretion  and 
prudence  about  current  affairs,  not  involving  fundamental  principles 
of  duty  and  order,  of  law  and  authority,  which  may  be  submitted  to 
the  popular  will  at  each  recurring  election.  But  the  fault  in  ques- 
tion goes  deeper.  It  is  now  maintained  that  every  subject  of  pub- 
lic interest  should  be  brought,  as  soon  as  may  be,  to  the  ballot  box, 
and  there  decided.  Now  nothing  is  plainer,  than  that  the  theory  of 
our  free  institutions  embraces  fixed  principles,  which  are  embodied 
in  the  constitution,  and  which  cannot  be  altered  except  in  a  peculiar 
and  specific  way,  differing  essentially  from  that  in  which  the  will  of 
tho  people  is  manifested  at  the  stated  election  of  our  rulers.  Two 
things  are  now  united  in  practice,  which  the  constitution  carefully 
separates.  For  at  the  election  of  a  President  of  the  United  States, 
as  at  present  conducted,  not  only  is  a  particular  person  selected,  but 
also  constitutional  and  other  fundamental  questions  are  decided,  and 
the  decision  is  expressed  by  the  choice  of  that  officer.     Thus  all  the 


8 

fundamental  doctrines  of  our  government  and  laws  are  subjected  ta 
the  caprice  and  hazards  of  violent  partizan  elections.  The  author- 
ity of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  extends  to  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  acts  of  Congress,  and  may  set  them  aside  whenever 
they  are,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Court  unconstitutional.  Hence,  if 
by  the  ballot  box  men  are  sent  to  Congress,  having  the  will  of  the 
people  on  constitutional  questions  to  govern  their  legislation,  all  their 
acts  must  pass  under  the  revision  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  stand 
or  fall  by  its  supreme  and  final  judgment.  Of  course  the  will  of  the 
people,  as  expressed  at  ordinary  elections,  is  not  supreme  law.— 
Otherwise,  it  would  govern  the  Supreme  Court,  as  well  as  the  other 
branches  of  the  government.  This  Court  holds  the  popular  will  in 
check,  and  makes  it  feel  its  subjection  to  fixed  principles  and  nation- 
al law.  Hence  the-  growing  hostility  to  that  Court.  It  is  in  the  way 
of  that  boundless  liberty  which  is  the  ruling  passion  of  the  times. — 
It  is  moreover,  a  barrier  to  the  selfish  and  lawless  schemes  of  par- 
ties, and  of  one  State  against  another.  As  the  interpreter  of  trea- 
ties, it  is  the  guardian  of  the  honor  and  faith  of  the  nation.  For- 
eigners may  find  justice  there.  The  power  of  this  Court  to  resist 
the  tide  of  popular  feeling,  and  to  enforce  the  faith  of  the  nation, 
was  brought  to  bear  in  the  great  case  of  the  Cherokees.  Had  the 
upright  and  legal  decision  of  the  Court  been  faithfully  executed,  the" 
Florida  war  would  have  never  occurred.  If  the  Indians  could  have 
had  justice  according  to  law,  and  their  treaties  with  us,  they  would 
have  never  appealed  to  the  rifle  and  tomahawk.  We  see  in  this  in- 
stance the  consequences  of  making  the  will  of  the  people  supreme 
law,  and  the  ballot  box  the  organ  of  its  publication. 

The  other  specification  of  the  application  of  the  dogma  of  self- 
sovereignty  asserted  in  our  day,  is  "  the  right  of  instruction,"  accor- 
ding to  the  famous  Virginia  Resolutions.  This  doctrine  grows  out 
of  the  popular  axiom,  that  the  will  of  the  people  is  supreme  law. 
But  it  is  subversive  of  a  representative  government.  For  in  a  rep- 
resentative government,  the  constituted  authorities  are  in  the  place 
and  room  of  the  people,  and  hold  for  the  time  being  all  their  power. 
They  represent  the  people  ;  and  of  course  the  people  are  merged  in 
them.  The  sovereignty  of  the  whole  people  passes  by  delegation  from 
themselves  to  their  substitutes,  and  there  remains  until  the  period  of 
a  new  election  returns  ;  and  when  it  returns,  they  merely  furnish 
persons  to  fill  offices,  and  not  both  the  offices  and  the  persons  to  filt 
them.     When  the  people  of  the  United  States  adopted  the  consihu- 


lion  they  transferred  their  sovereignty  to  the  officers  created  by  that 
instrument,  reserving  to  themselves  the  right  of  filling  a  part  of  those 
offices  by  persons  of  the  requisite  qualifications,  selected  by  them- 
selves, and  the  remainder  by  those  thus  selected.  The  whole  peo- 
ple thus  appear  and  act  in  the  government  by  delegation,  by  repre- 
sentation. As  individuals,  or  as  towns,  counties  and  States;  as  the 
north  or  the  south,  the  east  or  the  west  ;  as  free  or  as  slave-holding  ; 
as  commercial,  agricultural  or  mechanical,  the  whole  people  collec- 
tively, and  each  and  every  one  singly,  gave  up  their  power  and  will 
to  the  authorities  created  by  the  constitution.  These  authorities 
hold  "the  delegated  will  of  the  nation."  To  them  the  people  are 
subject,  and  they  are  bound  to  obey  them.  Washington,  in  his  fare- 
well address,  says:  "  The  basis  of  our  political  system,  is  the  right 
of  the  people  to  make  and  alter  their  constitution  of  government : 
but  the  constitution  which  at  any  time  exists,  till  changed  by  an  ex- 
plicit and  authentic  act  of  the  whole  people,  is  sacredly  obligatory 
upon  all.  The  very  idea  of  the  power  and  the  right  of  the  people 
to  establish  government,  presupposes  the  duty  of  every  individual  to 
obey  the  established  government." 

Now,  it  appears  to  me,  the  right  of  instructing  the  persons  who 
fill  either  of  the  departments  of  government,  whether  executive,  le- 
gislative or  judicial,  is  nothing  short  of  a  resumption,  by  the  people 
who  claim  this  right,  of  those  powers  which  they  have  transferred  to 
these  constituted  authorities,  and  it  amounts  to  an  abrogation  of  the 
constitution.  If  the  people  speak  for  themselves  and  exert  their  own 
authority,  they  put  aside,  in  the  case,  their  representatives.  He 
that  speaks  for  himself  has  no  use  for  an  attorney  ;  he  that  acts  for 
himself,  is  his  own  agent  and  factor  ;  he  that  appears  for  himself, 
needs  not  a  delegate.  It  is  plain  then,  that  in  those  cases  where  the 
people,  or  any  part  of  them,  impose  their  judgment  or  will  on  their 
rulers  for  the  purpose  of  directing  and  controlling  them,  they  take 
back  the  powers  they  had  given  them,  and  destroy  their  represent- 
ative character,  and  render  them  the  mere  messengers  and  organs 
of  their  will.  In  this  light  the  subject  appeared  to  Washington,  who 
in  his  address  beforementioned,  says  :  "All  obstructions  to  the  exe- 
cution of  the  laws,  all  combinations  and  associations,  under  whatev- 
er plausible  character,  with  the  real  design  to  direct,  control,  coun- 
teract, or  awe  the  regular  deliberation  and  action  of  the  constituted 
authorities,  are  destructive  of  this  fundamental  principle,  [see  previ- 
ous quotation,]  and  of  fatal  tendency.     They  serve  to  organize  fac* 


10 

tion,  to  give  it  an  artificial  and  extraordinary  force,  to  put  in  the 
place  of  the  delegated  will  of  the  nation,  the  will  of  a  party." 

But  it  is  maintained  by  the  abettors  of  the  right  of  instruction,  that 
the  United  States  Senate  is  the  representative  of  the  several  States 
in  their  capacity  as  States,  and  therefore  the  Legislatures,  which 
choose  the  Senators,  are  their  immediate  constituents,  and  as  their 
Senators  are  their  representatives,  it  is  necessary  to  instruct  them, 
that  they  may  represent  them  justly.  All  that  has  been  adduced  on 
the  subject  generally,  may,  in  answer  to  this,  be  appositely  and  con- 
clusively referred  to.  If  Senators  are  the  representatives  of  States, 
they  are  as  much  in  the  room  and  stead  of  the  States,  as  the  mem- 
bers of  the  lower  House  are  in  the  room  and  stead  of  the  people  ; 
and  hence  the  right  of  instruction,  if  it  exist  in  the  former  case,  ought 
by  parity  of  reason,  to  be  admitted  in  the  latter. 

If  the  Senate  may  be  instructed  by  the  Legislatures  of  the  States, 
and  be  bound  by  them,  they  are  not  representatives.  They  are 
mere  messengers,  agents,  or  factors.  They  are  no  longer  a  deliber- 
ative assembly,  but  an  executive  organ  to  ratify  the  deliberative  acts 
of  other  assemblies.  In  this  case  Senators  are  in  the  same  grade 
with  marshals,  and  sheriffs,  who  are  the  functionaries  of  other's  wills, 
without  any  of  their  own,  except  that  of  implicit  obedience  to  the 
mandates  of  authority.  In  short,  the  doctrine  of  instruction  anni- 
hilates the  Senate  as  a  legislative  body,  and  thus  dismembers  Con- 
gress, and  fundamentally  subverts  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  according  to  the  constitution. 

The  right  of  instruction  is,  moreover,  contrary  to  the  constitution 
in  another  respect.  According  to  it,  each  Senator  is  not  only  the 
representative  of  that  State  by  which  he  is  chosen,  but  also  of  every 
other  State  of  the  Union.  The  Senators  from  Connecticut,  for  ex- 
ample, have  the  same  jurisdiction  over  South  Carolina  or  Virginia, 
as  they  have  over  their  own  State.  The  Senate  is  a  unity.  Both 
jointly  and  severally  the  Senators  have  concurrent  authority  over 
each  and  every  State  of  the  Union.  Virginia  has  as  much  interest 
in  the  Senators  of  Connecticut  as  in  her  own,  and  is  as  much  sub- 
jected to  their  power.  Hence  it  follows,  that  if  Virginia  has  the 
right  of  instructing  her  own  Senators,  as  she  claims,  she  ought  to 
go  further,  and  instruct  ours  also,  and  even  the  whole.  It  is  plain, 
therefore,  that  the  doctrine  of  instruction,  carried  out  logically  to  its 
results,  dissolves  that  union  of  all  the  States  in  one  body  politic, 
which  the  constitution  intends,  and  is  virtually  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union, 


11 

The  doctrine  of  instruction  is  not  only  contrary  to  the  theory  of 
our  government,  but  it  is  inconsistent  with  all  government,  and  at 
war  with  a  social  state  under  any  possible  form.  For  the  notion  of 
society  is  the  union  of  several  individuals  in  some  one  or  more  re- 
spects, where  that  which  was  before  separate  and  peculiar  to  each 
individual  is  given  up  to  be  the  common  property  of  all.  If,  for  ex- 
ample, the  owner  of  a  field,  for  certain  valuable  considerations,  ad- 
mits his  neighbors  to  use  it  in  common  with  himself  for  pastur- 
age, or  a  highway,  he  gives  up  what  was  before  his  own  and  at  his 
own  sole  disposal,  to  be  the  joint  and  common  property  of  all. — 
Suppose  now  one  of  his  neighbors  gives  the  original  owner  instruc- 
tions concerning  the  way  and  manner  in  which  this  common  field,  this 
social  property,  shall  be  used,  both  by  him  and  the  others  of  the  com- 
pany, it  is  plain  that  he  steps  aside  from  his  place  as  one  of  the  part- 
ners, and  usurps  the  exclusive  control  of  that  which  is  not  his  exclu- 
sively. Every  other  partner  has  as  good  a  right  to  say  how  the  com- 
mon field  shall  be  used,  and  to  insist  on  a  compliance  of  the  rest  to  his 
will.  In  such  a  case,  society  in  the  use  of  the  field  is  impossible.  In 
like  manner  as  to  all  the  joint  and  common  affairs  and  interests  of  states 
and  nations,  individuals  must  merge  their  peculiar  and  several  wills 
in  one  that  shall  be  common  to  all,  and  binding  on  all,  or  society  is 
impossible.  In  our  social  state,  the  axiom  of  union  is  that  in  all  or- 
dinary cases  the  will  of  the  majority  shall  govern.  As  to  fundamen- 
tal principles,  like  those  which  are  embodied  in  the  constitution,  the 
will  of  two  thirds  is  necessary.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  will 
of  the  minority  must  submit,  or  our  union  is  at  an  end.  Hence  the 
notion  of  our  political  union  may  be  expressed  thus  :  the  majority  is 
the  representative  of  the  whole.  If  now  constituents  may  rightfully 
instruct  their  representatives,  why  may  not  the  minority  instruct  the 
majority  1  Thus  this  doctrine  of  instruction  runs  headlong  to  absur- 
dity and  all  confusion. 

Unaccustomed,  gentlemen,  to  speak  on  secular  topics,  I  have  with 
some  embarrassment  ventured  to  offer  my  views  on  a  fundamental 
question  of  national  policy.  You  will  receive  them  with  candor.— 
If  our  young  men,  on  whom  the  future  hopes  of  our  country  under 
Divine  Providence  depend,  wish  to  be  the  supporters  of  order  and 
the  friends  of  true  liberty,  they  must  study  the  first  principles  of 
morals.  Justice  is  the  cement  of  society,  for  it  is  benevolence  acting 
by  rule.  "  Thou  shall  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,"  is  the  equitable 
rule  of  justice,  and  the  basis  of  society,     A  rule  implies  and  requires 


12 

a,Ruler.  As  now  this  law  of  morals  forms  and  regulates  society,  it 
is  anterior  both  to  society  and  its  laws,  and  of  course  its  author  and 
protector.  God,  therefore,  is  that  Roler.  So  long  as  his  authority 
is  felt,  so  long  the  elements  of  society  will  maintain  their  life  and 
vigor.  The  fear  of  God  then  is  the  foundation  of  all  order.  Gov- 
ernment, law,  liberty,  peace,  all  flow  from  piety  to  God. 

"  Of  all  the  dispositions  and  habits  which  lead  to  political  pros- 
perity," said  Washington  in  his  farwewell  address,  "  religion  and 
morality  are  indispensible  supports.  In  vain  would  that  man  claim 
the  tribute  of  patriotism,  who  should  labor  to  subvert  these  great 
pillars  of  human  happiness,  these  firmest  props  of  the  duties  of  men 
and  citizens.  The  politician,  equally  with  the  pious  man,  ought  to 
respect  and  cherish  them.  A  volume  could  not  trace  all  their  con- 
nexions with  private  and  public  felicity.  Let  it  simply  be  asked, 
where  is  the  security  for  property,  for  reputation,  for  life,  if  the  sense 
of  religious  obligation  desert  the  oaths,  which  are  the  instruments  of 
investigation  in  courts  of  justice  1  And  let  us  with  caution  indulge  the 
supposition, thai  morality  can  be  maintained  without  religion.  What- 
ever may  be  conceded  to  the  influence  of  refined  education  on  minds 
of  peculiar  structure,  reason  and  experience  both  forbid  us  to  expect 
that  national  morality  can  prevail  to  the  exclusion  of  religious  prin- 
ciple. It  is  substantially  true,  that  virtue  or  morality  is  a  necessary 
spring  of  popular  government.  The  rule  extends  indeed,  with  more 
or  less  force,  to  every  species  of  free  government.  Who,  then,  that 
is  a  sincere  friend  to  it,  can  look  with  indifference  upon  attempts  to 
shake  the  foundation  of  the  fabric  V1 


Note. — "Judge  Hopkins,  of  Pa.,  says,  that  the  last  words  the  late 
Chief  Justice  Marshall  spoke  to  him,  about  a  week  before  he  died, 
were  these  :  'The  Virginia  doctrines  about  the  right  of  instruction, 
are  incompatible  not  only  with  the  government  of  the  United  Statesv 
but  with  any  government.'  " — Alexandria  Gazette. 

New  York  Spectator,  June  30th,  1836. 


Princeton  Theologic 


1012  01082  0258 


DATE  DUE 

^___^ 

M$P*1!IMH 

III 

CAYLORD 

PRINTED  IN  U.S.A. 

